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T h e  Mind-Body Problem
contains recent essays by
the key players i n  the
field: Searle, Fodor, Hon-
derich, Nagel, McGinn, Stich,
Rorty and others. But there are a
few interesting exceptions, f o r
example Edelman, Popper, Put-
nam and Dennett. Nevertheless,
these thinkers do get a mention
here and there, and nearly all the
exciting topical issues are dealt
with, including externalism, func-
tionalism, intentionality, Tur ing
computational models, and the
relationship between these philo-
sophical problems and psychology.
The writers fall into three broad
and vague categories: those who
espouse a  confident promissory
physicalism; those w h o  bold ly
assert the non-reducibility of the
mental; and those who think the
terms of the debate are unclear or
have other  reservations about
making any speculative leaps.
On the physicalist side there are
Lewis, Smart, Fodor, the Church-
lands and Shoemaker. With the aid
of a  Coke-dispensing machine,
Fodor contrasts logical behav-
iourism (which reduces the mental
to input and output) and internal
state functionalism (which includes
internal processing and accounts
for the interdetinability of mental
states). As a counter to functional-
ism, Honderich provides a power-
ful defence of the existence of a
mental content over and above any
functionalist causal relations and
introduces his Union theory.
I am particularly struck by the
tendency to engage in an evasive
stratagem when it comes to stating
the physicalist thesis. Instead of a
clear definitive position about
what k ind o f  physical science
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would achieve t h e  hoped-for
reduction, what I found was varia-
tions on Lewis's claim that the
reduction would be effected by a
"unified body of scientific theories
of the sort we now accept". Mate-
rialism used to be a clear doctrine:
a clockwork Universe of impene-
trable particles. But  materialism
transcended itself. F i r t  through
Newton's demolition of the Carte-
sian idea that matter was essen-
tially extension b y  introducing
gravity (action at a distance) and
then through the field iheories of
Faraday and Maxwell, and more
recently through Einstein's work,
which undermined t h e  " sub -
stance" view of matter, something
that remained permanent while
other changes occurred. John
Wheeler o n c e  s a i d  "par t ic le
physics is not the right starting
point for particle physics. Vacuum
physics is". "Matter" is more accu-
rately seen as a process that is one
form of energy, and the physical
world is now conceived as an inter-
action of processes rather than of
things — talk of particles is short-
hand.
The trouble with Lewis's phrase
"of the sort we now accept", per-
spicuously focused on by the edi-
tors, is that i t  is open to endless
shift as science progresses. What-
ever new explanatory theories and
concepts are developed, the physi-
calist can just call these "physical".
The Churchlands are very confi-
dent about a  future physicalist
reduction of the mental and their
discussion of the reduction of tem-
perature t o  molecular kinet ic
energy is helpful as a paradigm.
However, they neglect to point out
that this reduction is incomplete. It
fails to account for the tempera-
ture of plasma, which consists of
disintegrated atoms, a n d  t h e
behaviour of a system of particles
is subject t o  what Donald T.
Campbell calls "downward causa-
tion" — the structure of a star, for
example, constrains the behaviour
and even type of the constituent
particles. The Churchlands also
portray Newton's theory as  a
reduction of Kepler's laws, but, as
first noted b y  Duhem (1906),
Kepler's laws contradict Newton's
theory because they assume that
the planets do not interact. Popper
(1972) pointed out that Kepler's
laws can be derived from New-
ton's theory only i f  one assumes
the planets have either equal or
zero mass and also injects into
Kepler's theory the post-Kepler-
tan notion o f  gravity — that is,
only by denying Newton's and
Kepler's theories.
Getting your ACT together
learning, and i n  such circum-
stances a change in attitude will
Some o f  those who express
reservations about the possibility
of a physical explanation or reduc-
tion reveal a  misapprehension
about the logic of debate. Nagel
suggests that in the absence of a
detailed physical reduction, one
should not speculate either posi-
tively or negatively. But it is only
speculation (plus refutation) that
will take us beyond the known.
Of particular interest for psy-
chologists is Stich's discussion of
experimental studies o f  concept
formation and use that show that
people ordinarily do not construct
concepts from necessary and suffi-
cient conditions, but instead use
protoiypical cases or make up con-
cepts according to the problem in
hand. These facts. Stich says,
undermine the traditional Socratic
method o f  conceptual analysis,
and indicate that there are no clas-
sical concepts. However, one can
simply stipulate a concept by a set
of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, as is done in science.
Searle is as bold as ever, and he
gives a  good argument that the
terms of the debate are misleading.
The following, Searle says, are not
easily categorised in to mental or
physical: balance-of-payments
problems, ungrammatical s e n -
tences, reasons for being suspicious
of modal logic, my ability to ski and
points scored in football games.
Although a good snapshot of
the mind-body debate I  got the
impression that insufficient anew.
31
tion is paid to  the explanatory
potential of the evolutionary per-
spective, a perspective developed
by, among others, Dennett, Edel-
man, Campbell, Popper  a n d
Eccles. A n  important break-
through here would be to show
how abstract theories and argu-
ments, as opposed to concepts, can
evolve from rudimentary advanta-
geous "fitting" o r  "matching" of
biology and world.
Moreover, given the testable
versions of emergentism by Stuart
Kaufman and others, i t  i s  dis-
missed too easily. Also neglected
is Popper's tripartite ontological
division of the world into the three
domains: world 1 (the world o f
physics), world 2 (the world of psy-
chological states and dispositions)
and world 3 (the world of  objec-
tive theories and other abstract
products of the human mind). It is
not obvious, as Galen Strawson
suggests, that one is a materialist
simply by positing non-experien-
tial phenomena. Each of the items
in Searle's heterogeneous l i s t
could be accurately analysed in
terms of these three domains. A
score in a football game, for exam-
ple, can be analysed, as a first step,
into the physical marks or elec-
tronic states that code the score
(world 1), the number understood
as an abstract object with proper-
ties independent of its coding and
the logical ramifications o f  this
score for the game (world 3), and
the psychological grasping of the
score and its logical ramifications
for the game and the individual
player (world 2).
Ray Percival is organiser o f  an
annual conference on the philoso-
phy of Karl Popper.
